Stargate
About
Stargate is a composable cross-chain liquidity transport protocol enabling seamless asset transfers between blockchains. It uses LayerZero's omnichain interoperability to facilitate native asset bridging with unified liquidity pools, serving users needing fast, secure cross-chain transfers of assets like USDC, ETH, and USDT across multiple networks.
Where Does Yield Come From?
Stargate lets people earn rewards in three main ways.
1. Supplying tokens to liquidity pools
Users deposit tokens (like USDC) into shared cross-chain pools. In return, they get LP tokens (for example, sUSDC). These represent their share of the pool and earn them rewards — either in Stargate's own token (STG) or in the native token of the blockchain they're using.
2. Farming LP tokens
After getting LP tokens, users can "stake" (lock up) them in farms to earn extra STG rewards. How much they earn depends on how heavily the pool is being used, how much total value sits in the pool, and which bonus programs are running at the time.
3. Staking STG for voting power and fees
Users can also stake their STG tokens to receive veSTG (a locked version of STG). This gives them voting rights in the protocol and a share of monthly fees collected from users.
Where the rewards come from
The protocol earns money through bridging fees — small charges paid by people who transfer assets across blockchains. Those fees flow back to liquidity providers and veSTG holders. On top of that, new STG tokens are released as extra incentives (emissions) to reward participation.
The big picture
All these pieces work together to keep liquidity flowing smoothly between blockchains and to reward people who help govern or fund the system.
Audits
| Audit / Date | Findings | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
Zellic25-03-2024 - 12-04-2024 |
| The audit identified one high‑severity issue and several medium‑to‑low issues, all of which were acknowledged and fixed by the LayerZero Labs team prior to deployment. The overall security posture is solid with no critical vulnerabilities found. |
OtterSec22-03-2024 - 19-04-2024 |
| The audit uncovered one high‑severity vulnerability and several medium/low issues, all of which were resolved before deployment, reflecting a comprehensive security review and effective remediation. |
Quantstamp23-11-2021 - 28-11-2021 |
| Quantstamp's audit found three high‑risk and three medium‑risk vulnerabilities, all of which were resolved before launch, leaving the protocol with standard informational recommendations and no critical flaws in the reviewed scope. |
Zokyo21-03-2022 |
| The audit found only low‑risk issues, all of which were fixed, indicating a robust codebase with strong adherence to security best practices at the time of review. |
Quantstamp24-01-2022 - 24-02-2022 |
| Quantstamp's review found no high or critical vulnerabilities, with all identified medium and low issues either resolved or acknowledged by the team, indicating a generally secure codebase with appropriate follow-up actions taken. |
Quantstamp24-01-2022 - 11-03-2022 |
| The audit found one critical cross-chain synchronization flaw that was fixed before deployment, with remaining medium and informational issues acknowledged by the team as acceptable risks or design trade-offs. Overall, the codebase was considered well-written with extensive test coverage, though some documentation and best-practice improvements were recommended. |
Zellic21-02-2022 - 04-03-2022 |
| The audit revealed no critical vulnerabilities, but identified one high-severity cross-chain accounting bug that was promptly fixed, leaving the protocol with moderate residual risk from lower-severity issues. |
Ackee Blockchain14-06-2022 - 17-06-2022 |
| The audit revealed two high-risk concerns—compiler optimizer usage and missing input validation—along with several code-quality improvements, with all but the optimizer issue fixed in a subsequent review. |
Ackee Blockchain14-06-2022 - 17-06-2022 |
| The review uncovered two high‑impact issues that should be addressed, but the overall risk is moderated by the narrow scope of the audited contracts and the low likelihood of exploitation. The findings are typical for a short‑duration audit focused on wrapper‑style components. |
Ackee Blockchain22-06-2022 - 28-06-2022 |
| The audit revealed a high‑risk integer overflow vulnerability in casting, alongside several code‑quality warnings, with recommendations to implement safety checks and improve documentation. |
Ackee Blockchain22-06-2022 - 28-06-2022 |
| The audit found one high-severity arithmetic overflow risk and several code-quality warnings, all of which were addressed in the fix review, leaving no critical vulnerabilities in the Fee Library V4 at the time of the report. |
Ackee Blockchain30-06-2022 - 08-07-2022 |
| The audit found one medium-severity issue related to unchecked ERC20 transfers and several low-severity code quality improvements, indicating generally robust code with minor security and best-practice gaps. |
Ackee Blockchain12-07-202214-07-2022 |
| The audit identified one medium-risk issue related to unchecked ERC20 transfers, along with several warnings and informational findings, all of which were subsequently fixed. The code quality was assessed as excellent, with no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities remaining. |
Zellic14-12-2022 |
| The audit identified minor concerns around price updates and code complexity, with no critical vulnerabilities found in the reviewed updates. |
Ackee Blockchain29-03-2022 |
| The audit identified only minor code quality and best practice issues, with no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities found. The warning regarding integer casting overflow has low exploit likelihood, indicating the Voting Escrow contracts are relatively secure. |
Ackee Blockchain13-04-202215-04-2022 |
| The audit identified only minor code quality and best practice issues, with no critical vulnerabilities found. The integer casting overflow warning carries negligible exploit likelihood, and all findings were acknowledged by the developers. |
Legal
Legal form
Foundation
Registration jurisdiction
Cayman Islands
Status and notes
Website and hosted user application provided by the Stargate Foundation, along with its various subsidiaries and affiliated entities globally including the ZRO Association (dba the ZRO Foundation). Terms governed by Cayman Islands law; arbitration seated in George Town, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands. Privacy Policy references Stargate Foundation.