Jarvis Network (Synthereum)
About
Jarvis Network is a DeFi protocol that issues over-collateralized synthetic fiat currencies called jFIATs (jEUR, jGBP, jCHF, jMXN, etc.) on multiple EVM-compatible chains (Ethereum, Polygon, BNB Chain, Avalanche, Gnosis Chain, Base, Arbitrum, Optimism, Sonic). Users can mint, borrow, swap at oracle price with no price impact, and earn yield on these synthetic stablecoins. The protocol functions as an on-chain forex infrastructure for retail users, remittance corridors, and other stablecoin protocols seeking liquidity and peg support.
Where Does Yield Come From?
Yield on Jarvis Network comes from five main sources. Here is how each one works.
1. Liquidity Pool (LP) revenues
People who provide collateral (like USDC) to jFIAT Liquidity Pools become the trading counterparty when others buy or sell synthetic currencies on the protocol. These liquidity providers earn money in two ways:
- Swap fees — paid by users who trade at the oracle (reference) price.
- Interest from lending — the protocol lends the pool's collateral on external lending platforms (like Aave or Morpho). The interest earned is split between liquidity providers and the protocol treasury at a ratio set by governance (for example, 90% to LPs, 10% to the treasury).
Because of a "virtual liquidity" system, even a small deposit can support large trades. This creates a multiplier effect on the effective yield of the deposited collateral.
2. Lending on Morpho vaults
Users can deposit jEUR or USDC into Jarvis-managed vaults on Morpho (called mjEUR and mjUSDC). These vaults lend the deposits into over-collateralized Morpho markets (where loans are backed by assets like stEUR, stUSD, USDC, cbBTC, cbETH, or wstETH). Lenders earn the variable interest that borrowers pay. A 10% performance fee is taken from the earned interest before the rest is distributed to vault depositors.
3. Borrowing on Morpho
Users can borrow jEUR or USDC against approved collateral on Morpho. They pay variable interest rates based on how much of the market's lending capacity is being used. If a borrower's health ratio (a measure of loan safety) drops too low, a liquidation penalty of 4.38% applies. The borrowed jFIATs can then be used elsewhere in DeFi to earn additional yield, which can create leveraged strategies.
4. JARVIS token staking (veJARVIS)
Users who provide JARVIS-ETH liquidity pool tokens can stake them to receive stJARVIS (a vote-escrowed form of the token). stJARVIS holders get voting power over protocol decisions (like treasury allocation and gauge weights) and can claim staking rewards. These rewards come from protocol revenues including: commissions on interest from lent collateral, treasury management activities (trading, lending, farming), Automated Market Operations (an arbitrage mechanism), bond or token sales, and returns from Protocol Owned Liquidity (POL). Importantly, no inflationary token creation is used to subsidize this yield.
5. Money Printer
Governance-controlled contracts can issue un-collateralized jFIATs to seed liquidity or carry out special transactions. Any fees collected this way flow back to the protocol treasury.
All fee splits, revenue distributions, and reward settings are controlled by governance through the veJARVIS voting system.
Persons
Pascal Tallarida
Founder
Audits
| Audit / Date | Findings | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| The audit found only one Low issue and two Informational notes with no Critical, High, or Medium vulnerabilities, indicating the Perpetual-PoolParty contracts were well-constructed at the time of review; however, economic and oracle attack vectors were explicitly excluded from scope and should be validated separately. | |
| The audit found no critical, high, or medium severity vulnerabilities in the in-scope Jarvis V3 contracts, with only two low-severity and two informational findings, indicating a satisfactory security posture for the scoped codebase at the time of review. | |
Halborn09-03-2021 |
| Halborn's audit of Synthereum v3 found no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities, with only low and informational items that the Jarvis team justified as acceptable design trade-offs or false positives. The protocol's safety posture was sound at the time of this engagement. |
Halborn05-11-2021 - 16-11-2021 |
| The audit found one high-severity risk (admin self-revocation) and one medium-severity issue (unvalidated implementation registration), which if left unaddressed could lead to loss of contract control or malicious implementation substitution; the remaining findings are low/informational best-practice items. Overall, the report assesses the contracts as satisfactory for the scope examined but recommends fixing the high and medium findings before production use. |
Halborn09-12-2021 - 23-12-2021 |
| The audit found no critical, high, or medium severity issues, with ten low-severity and three informational findings; most were acknowledged by the Jarvis team, and a few (including the DOS and boolean comparison) were remediated. The report concludes the outcome is satisfactory given the scope and time constraints. |
Halborn05-11-2021 |
| This response document confirms Halborn found no critical vulnerabilities, with the single HIGH finding accepted as mitigated by multisig governance and the MEDIUM finding scoped to admin-trusted operations. Residual risk is low given the existing access controls, though dependency updates were deferred to a future release. |
Halborn27-12-2020 |
| The audit uncovered no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities, with only low-risk and informational findings that are typical for an early-stage smart contract review. The engagement indicates a reasonable security posture for the Synthereum PerpetualPoolParty contracts at the time of assessment. |
Halborn09-03-2021 |
| The audit found no critical or high-severity issues, with only two low-severity and two informational findings, indicating the Synthereum smart contracts were in a strong security posture at the time of review. All identified issues are low-risk best-practice improvements rather than exploitable vulnerabilities. |
Ubik27-04-2021 - 25-05-2021 |
| The audit found no critical or high-risk vulnerabilities, with only 2 medium and 1 low-severity issues that require minimal remediation effort, indicating the Synthereum v3 contracts were in strong security posture at the time of review. |
Zellic30-05-2022 - 10-06-2022 |
| The audit found no critical vulnerabilities, and the highest-impact issue (pool migration loss of funds) was addressed by Jarvis via a dedicated migration library, though that contract fell outside the audit scope. Residual risks are limited to centralization (mitigated by multisig and hardware wallets) and code-maturity validation gaps that Jarvis has acknowledged. |
Backers
The Jarvis Network homepage lists four investment firms as backers in its "Investors" section: Bering Waters, TRGC Capital (TRCG Capital), Lionschain Capital, and Stake Capital. No specific funding rounds, investment amounts, or dates are disclosed on the official website, the protocol documentation (learn.jarvis.network), or the Medium blog.
Legal
Legal form
Private limited company (LTD)
Registration jurisdiction
Cayman Islands (George Town, Grand Cayman) — registration number 338560
Status and notes
Operator is Jarvis LTD, registered in the Cayman Islands (registration no. 338560). Registered address: c/o Silverside Management Ltd, P.O. Box 31489 Whitehall Chambers, 2nd fl., Whitehall House, 238 North Church Str., George Town, Grand Cayman KY1-1206. Contact: [email protected]. No separate Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, or Imprint pages are published on the official website (all return 404).