defidollar-io
Audits
| Audit / Date | Findings | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
ChainSecurity30-08-2024 - 14-05-2025 |
| The audit revealed several critical and high-severity vulnerabilities that were addressed through code corrections, resulting in improved security for Liquity V2's Bold smart contracts. The final assessment indicates the core contracts provide a good level of security, though complexity remains a risk factor. |
Dedaub28-08-2024 |
| The audit revealed no critical vulnerabilities but identified multiple medium and high-severity issues, primarily related to the complex batch interest delegation feature, which were all resolved by the Liquity team before deployment. |
Dedaub11-11-2024 |
| The audit revealed no critical or high-risk vulnerabilities, with only low-severity and advisory issues identified, most of which were resolved or acknowledged, indicating a robust security posture for Liquity v2. |
Certora09-09-2024 - 22-11-2024 |
| The formal verification confirms that the core batch management logic behaves as specified, with all 14 mathematical properties proven correct, providing strong assurance about the protocol's internal consistency and equivalence between individual and batch-managed troves. |
Coinspect01-12-2024 |
| The audit found no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities in Liquity V2 Bold Core, with only two medium issues identified and multiple informational findings, indicating a robust implementation with some deferred design considerations around oracle dependency risks. |
Coinspect01-01-2025 |
| The audit found only one medium-severity issue that was resolved through documentation, with two additional low-priority concerns acknowledged by the team, indicating a relatively secure governance implementation with minor edge-case considerations. |
ChainSecurity25-09-2024 - 16-01-2025 |
| The audit uncovered significant security issues in early versions, including a critical vote manipulation vulnerability, but all critical and high severity findings were resolved in subsequent code iterations. The final codebase provides a satisfactory level of security according to the auditor, though some medium/low risks were accepted or acknowledged. |
Dedaub12-08-2024 |
| The audit uncovered multiple critical security flaws in Liquity v2 Governance's bribe mechanism and reentrancy protection, all of which were resolved before deployment, though the system required significant refactoring to address fundamental design issues. |
Dedaub11-11-2024 |
| This re-audit of Liquity v2 Governance found significant high and medium severity issues in the refactored code, all of which were resolved or acknowledged by the team, though the extent of changes introduced new vulnerabilities alongside fixes for previous audit findings. |
Dedaub22-12-2024 - 17-01-2025 |
| The audit identified several significant issues, most of which were resolved or acknowledged, with the high-severity bribe calculation bug fixed. The governance system shows iterative improvement but retains some edge-case risks around voting fairness and allocation mechanics. |
Chaos Labs01-10-2024 |
| This mechanism design review provides extensive simulation‑based analysis of Liquity V2’s economic parameters and recommends adjustments to enhance stability under stress, but it does not constitute a security audit with enumerated vulnerabilities. |
Legal
Legal form
corporation
Registration jurisdiction
Samoa
Status and notes
Terms of Service identify operator as Majestic Team International CO., Ltd., a corporation organized under laws of Samoa. Protocol described as friendly fork of Liquity V2. No imprint or privacy policy page found on official sources.