Concrete Stable Vaults
About
Concrete's Stable Vaults allow users to deposit USDT or frxUSD to provide early liquidity for the upcoming Stable Network, an institutional-grade blockchain built for stablecoins. Deposits are deployed into automated yield strategies on Ethereum L1, and users receive receipt tokens representing their position. The platform manages fund allocation and rebalancing between different DeFi protocols to optimize returns.
Where Does Yield Come From?
Concrete's Stable Vaults let users deposit USDT or frxUSD to support the upcoming Stable Network, a blockchain built for stablecoins. Your deposit is automatically put to work in yield-earning strategies on Ethereum's main network (Layer 1). You receive a receipt token that shows your share of the vault.
How your funds earn yield:
The vault places your stablecoins into lending pools (using Morpho) on Ethereum. An automated system constantly moves funds between different lending platforms like Aave and Compound, chasing the best interest rates available. It considers transaction costs and long-term potential. This provides a baseline return from basic interest (lending).
Beyond that basic lending interest, the platform may use leveraged strategies to boost returns. For example, it can use vault liquidity to provide flash loans (quick, collateral-free loans) or other capital disbursements, collecting fees that add to the overall yield.
Additional benefits:
During the pre‑launch campaign, participants earn Concrete Points for joining. Any extra rewards from outside sources are passed on to users via a distribution system called Merkl.
Future plans:
Once the Stable Network goes live, your funds will migrate there and continue earning yield directly on that new chain. Concrete also plans to introduce Ecosystem ETFs in the future, which would spread investments across multiple DeFi protocols for further diversification.
Persons
Nic Roberts-Huntley
CEO and co-founder
Luke Hajdukiewicz
Chief Growth Officer
LinkedInGraeme Barnes
Head of Product
Haythem Sellami
Senior Smart Contract Engineer
Gustavo Silva
Engineering Manager
Audits
| Audit / Date | Findings | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
Cantina04-11-2025 - 09-11-2025 |
| The audit revealed no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities, with all identified low-risk issues either fixed or acknowledged as acceptable design trade-offs, indicating a generally secure implementation of the Earn v2 Core system. |
HALBORN04-02-2026 - 05-02-2026 |
| The audit found only two informational issues that were promptly resolved, indicating the Looping Strategy Swapper Contract has no significant security risks remaining after remediation, though Halborn recommends follow-up assessments within six months or after material code changes. |
Halborn24-11-2025 - 04-12-2025 |
| This audit found only low and informational severity issues, all of which were addressed by the team, indicating a well-secured codebase with no critical or high-risk vulnerabilities remaining. |
Halborn19-11-2025 - 20-11-2025 |
| The audit identified only informational findings, with all issues either solved or acknowledged as expected behavior, indicating the whitelisting hook was robustly implemented with no security-critical defects. |
Halborn20-10-2025 - 23-10-2025 |
| The audit revealed one high-risk cross-chain inconsistency and three lower-severity issues, all of which were resolved before deployment, indicating effective remediation and a secure final implementation. |
Halborn23-09-2025 - 30-09-2025 |
| The audit revealed no critical or high severity issues, with only one low-risk finding and several informational improvements, all of which were resolved or acknowledged by the development team. |
Halborn03-09-2025 - 16-09-2025 |
| The audit found no critical or high severity vulnerabilities, with only three low-risk issues and several informational design considerations, most of which were either fixed or consciously accepted by the development team. |
Halborn17-09-2025 - 29-09-2025 |
| The audit found no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities, with the single medium issue considered not applicable due to off-chain rewards usage, leaving the protocol with only low and informational risks that were largely accepted by the team. |
Halborn22-04-2024 - 19-07-2024 |
| Halborn's audit revealed no critical or high severity vulnerabilities, with one medium and four low severity issues all addressed or acknowledged by the Concrete team, indicating a reasonably secure codebase post-remediation. |
Zellic16-05-2025 - 06-06-2025 |
| Zellic's assessment uncovered a substantial number of issues across severity levels, concluding that the Concrete Stable Vaults project is not yet ready for production and requires a comprehensive reassessment before deployment. |
Halborn16-05-2025 - 16-05-2025 |
| Halborn's audit identified no security vulnerabilities in the withdrawal queue delay update, confirming the implementation was secure with proper access controls and event logging. This clean report suggests the specific changes reviewed pose no immediate security risks. |
Halborn26-03-2025 - 28-03-2025 |
| The audit uncovered one high-severity slippage vulnerability alongside three lower-severity approval and transfer issues, all of which were promptly fixed by the development team prior to report finalization. |
Halborn28-02-2025 - 06-03-2025 |
| The audit uncovered no critical vulnerabilities but identified one high-severity slippage issue alongside several medium and low-risk findings, all of which were addressed by the Blueprint Finance team before deployment. |
Halborn12-02-2025 - 13-02-2025 |
| The audit found only low-severity design issues with one resolved and one accepted as by-design, indicating the rewards distribution contracts have basic security hygiene but rely on trusted admin multisig for central functions. |
Halborn27-12-2024 - 30-12-2024 |
| The audit found only minor issues that were promptly resolved, indicating the VaultManager contract was secure with no major vulnerabilities identified during the assessment period. |
Halborn05-02-2025 - 11-02-2025 |
| The audit revealed only low and informational issues, all of which were either resolved or formally accepted by the team, indicating a well-secured upgradeable migration implementation with appropriate risk management. |
Halborn09-01-2025 - 24-01-2025 |
| The audit confirms that Concrete effectively addressed nearly all medium and low severity findings from the Code4rena contest, with no critical or high severity issues remaining after remediation, indicating a robust security posture for the reviewed fixes. |
Halborn27-01-2025 - 10-02-2025 |
| This follow-up audit successfully addressed all disputed findings from the original Code4rena contest, with no critical or high severity issues remaining and medium/low risks either mitigated or formally accepted. |
Halborn07-01-2025 - 07-01-2025 |
| The audit found only minor code-quality issues in the new withdrawal pause mechanism, all of which were promptly fixed, indicating a well-contained security review with no critical or high-risk vulnerabilities remaining. |
Halborn25-11-2024 |
| This focused audit of the harvestRewards function improvements found only low and informational issues, all of which were resolved or acknowledged by the Concrete team, indicating robust remediation prior to deployment. |
Halborn11-11-2024 - 22-11-2024 |
| The audit identified several medium-risk issues in the Morpho V1 lender integration, all of which were either resolved or formally accepted by the Concrete team, resulting in no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities remaining. The comprehensive remediation demonstrates effective security practices and risk management. |
Halborn04-11-2024 - 07-11-2024 |
| The audit found no critical vulnerabilities and all identified issues were resolved, with the highest severity being a single high-risk finding related to protectStrategy management that could have led to fund loss. |
Halborn02-09-2024 - 20-09-2024 |
| The audit indicates Concrete addressed all reported vulnerabilities, though several design assumptions and informational items remain acknowledged. The resolved critical issues mitigate significant risks to token accounting and access control. |
Halborn12-08-2024 - 10-09-2024 |
| The Halborn audit identified 24 vulnerabilities including 1 critical, 3 high, and 7 medium severity issues, all of which were resolved by the Concrete team. The comprehensive review covered core protocol functionality with particular attention to protection mechanisms and access controls. |
Halborn29-07-2024 - 01-08-2024 |
| The audit revealed only low-risk and informational issues, all of which were addressed by the Concrete team, indicating the Spokes contracts were secure at the time of assessment with no critical vulnerabilities present. |
Halborn16-07-2024 - 19-07-2024 |
| The audit found only informational issues, all of which were addressed by the Concrete team, indicating the strategies' code had no security vulnerabilities above informational severity at the time of assessment. |
Backers
Blueprint Finance, the core contributor behind Concrete, raised $9.5 million in a funding round led by Polychain Capital, with strategic participation from Yzi Labs (formerly Binance Labs). This brings total funding to over $17 million. Other investors include VanEck, Selini Capital, Portal Ventures, Auros, Halo Capital, Leadblock Bitpanda Ventures, Decima, Gate Ventures, Presto Labs, Baboon VC, Pivot Global, Nonce Classic, Founderheads, Curved Ventures, CryptoDiscover, Adaptive Frontier, Renzo, and BitGo.
Legal
Legal form
Foundation
Registration jurisdiction
Cayman Islands
Status and notes
Official Terms of Use state CONCRETE FOUNDATION is the contracting entity. Privacy Policy mentions Blueprint Finance as operator. Concrete Network, Ltd. is referenced as the entity seeking admission to trading of the Concrete token under MiCAR (EU Regulation 2023/1114). Terms governed by Cayman Islands law.